View single post by Joe Kelley
 Posted: Wed Dec 5th, 2012 10:28 pm
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Joe Kelley

 

Joined: Mon Nov 21st, 2005
Location: California USA
Posts: 6408
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"Responsibility must be individual, or there is no responsibility at all."
Equitable Commerce by Josiah Warren, 1852

http://www.theyliewedie.org/ressources/biblio/en/Warren_Josiah_-_EQUITABLE_COMMERCE.html

Rothbard page 215-216
The Spooner-Tucker Distortion

It should be remembered by radicals that, if they wanted to, all workers could refuse to work for wages and instead form their own producer's cooperatives and wait for years for their pay until the products are sold to the consumers; the fact that they do not do so, shows the enormous advantage of the capital investment, wage-paying system as a means of allowing workers to earn money far in advance of the sale of their products. Far from being exploitation of the workers, capital investment and the interest-profit system is an enormous boon to them and to all of society.

http://mises.org/etexts/menger/two.asp

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Here human self-interest finds an incentive to make itself felt, and where the available quantity does not suffice for all, every individual will attempt to secure his own requirements as completely as possible to the exclusion of others.
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AND

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We saw that economic goods are goods whose available quantities are smaller than the requirements for them. Wealth can therefore also be defined as the entire sum of goods at an economizing individual’s command, the quantities of which are smaller than the requirements for them. Hence, if there were a society where all goods were available in amounts exceeding the requirements for them, there would be no economic goods nor any “wealth.”
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Archive Book links


George Washington Tax Collector

Every time one commands one obeys and one will disobey each time. <-me


http://www.usa-the-republic.com/items%20of%20interest/trial_by_jury/trial03b.html#p86

The king, so far from being invested with arbitrary power, was only considered as the first among the citizens; his authority depended more on his personal qualities than on his station; he was even so far on a level with the people, that a stated price was fixed for his head, and a legal fine was levied upon his murderer, which though proportionate to his station, and superior to that paid for the life of a subject, was a sensible mark of his subordination to the community." - 1 Hume, Appendix, l.

Samuel Butler's (1612-1680) 17th-century poem Hudibras. Part III, Canto iii, lines 547-550 read thus:
He that complies against his will
Is of his own opinion still
Which he may adhere to, yet disown,
For reasons to himself best known



http://teacher.sduhsd.net/tpsocialsciences/american_govt/antipapers/msmith.htm

FRIDAY, June 20, 1788
Melancton Smith

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He was pleased that, thus early in debate, the honorable gentleman had himself shown that the intent of the Constitution was not a confederacy, but a reduction of all the states into a consolidated government. He hoped the gentleman would be complaisant enough to exchange names with those who disliked the Constitution, as it appeared from his own concessions, that they were federalists, and those who advocated it were anti-federalists.
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http://www.barefootsworld.net/trial01.html

FOR more than six hundred years - that is, since Magna Carta, in 1215 - there has been no clearer principle of English or American constitutional law, than that, in criminal cases, it is not only the right and duty of juries to judge what are the facts, what is the law, and what was the moral intent of the accused; but that it is also their right, and their primary and paramount duty, to judge of the justice of the law, and to hold all laws invalid, that are, in their opinion, unjust or oppressive, and all persons guiltless in violating, or resisting the execution of, such laws.

Unless such be the right and duty of jurors, it is plain that, instead of juries being a "palladium of liberty "- a barrier against the tyranny and oppression of the government - they are really mere tools in its hands, for carrying into execution any injustice and oppression it may desire to have executed.

But for their right to judge of the law, and the justice of the law, juries would be no protection to an accused person, even as to matters of fact; for, if the government can dictate to a jury any law whatever, in a criminal case, it can certainly dictate to them the laws of evidence. That is, it can dictate what evidence is admissible, and what inadmissible, and also what force or weight is to be given to the evidence admitted. And if the government can thus dictate to a jury the laws of evidence, it can not only make it necessary for them to convict on a partial exhibition of the evidence rightfully pertaining to the case, but it can even require them to convict on any evidence whatever that it pleases to offer them.

That the rights and duties of jurors must necessarily be such as are here claimed for them, will be evident when it is considered what the trial by jury is, and what is its object. "The trial by jury," then, is a "trial by the country" - that is, by the people - as distinguished from a trial by the government.

It was anciently called "trial per pais" - that is, "trial by the country." And now, in every criminal trial, the jury are told that the accused "has, for trial, put himself upon the country; which country you (the jury) are." The object of this trial "by the country," or by the people, in preference to a trial by the government, is to guard against every species of oppression by the government. In order to effect this end, it is indispensable that the people, or "the country," judge of and determine their own liberties against the government; instead of the government's judging of and determining its own powers over the people. How is it possible that juries can do anything to protect the liberties of the people against the government, if they are not allowed to determine what those liberties are?

Any government, that is its own judge of, and determines authoritatively for the people, what are its own powers over the people, is an absolute government of course. It has all the powers that it chooses to exercise. There is no other - or at least no more accurate - definition of a despotism than this. On the other hand, any people, that judge of, and determine authoritatively for the government, what are their own liberties against the government, of course retain all the liberties they wish to enjoy. And this is freedom. At least, it is freedom to them; because, although it may be theoretically imperfect, it, nevertheless, corresponds to their highest notions of freedom.

To secure this right of the people to judge of their own liberties against the government, the jurors are taken, (or must be, to make them lawful jurors,} from the body of the people, by lot, or by some process that precludes any previous knowledge, choice, or selection of them, on the part of the government.

This is done to prevent the government's constituting a jury of its own partisans or friends; in other words, to prevent the government's packing a jury, with a view to maintain its own laws, and accomplish its own purposes.

It is supposed that, if twelve men be taken, by lot, from the mass of the people, without the possibility of any previous knowledge, choice, or selection of them, on the part of the government, the jury will be a fair epitome of "the country" at large, and not merely of the party or faction that sustain the measures of the government; that substantially all classes of opinions, prevailing among the people, will be represented in the jury; and especially that the opponents of the government, (if the government have any opponents,) will be represented there, as well as its friends; that the classes, who are oppressed by the laws of the government, (if any are thus oppressed,) will have their representatives in the jury, as well as those classes, who take sides with the oppressor - that is, with the government.

It is fairly presumable that such a tribunal will agree to no conviction except such as substantially the whole country would agree to, if they were present, taking part in the trial. A trial by such a tribunal is, therefore, in effect, "a trial by the country." In its results it probably comes as near to a trial by the whole country, as any trial that it is practicable to have, without too great inconvenience and expense. And. as unanimity is required for a conviction, it follows that no one can be convicted, except for the violation of such laws as substantially the whole country wish to have maintained. The government can enforce none of its laws, (by punishing offenders, through the verdicts of juries,) except such as substantially the whole people wish to have enforced. The government, therefore, consistently with the trial by jury, can exercise no powers over the people, (or, what is the same thing, over the accused person, who represents the rights of the people,) except such as substantially the whole people of the country consent that it may exercise. In such a trial, therefore, "the country," or the people, judge of and determine their own liberties against the government, instead of the government's judging of and determining its own powers over the people.

But all this "trial by the country" would be no trial at all "by the country," but only a trial by the government, if the government 'could either declare who may, and who may not, be jurors, or could dictate to the jury anything whatever, either of law or evidence, that is of the essence of the trial.

If the government may decide who may, and who may not, be jurors, it will of course select only its partisans, and those friendly to its measures. It may not only prescribe who may, and who may not, be eligible to be drawn as jurors; but it may also question each person drawn as a juror, as to his sentiments in regard to the particular law involved in each trial, before suffering him to be sworn on the panel; and exclude him if he be found unfavorable to the maintenance of such a law.

So, also, if the government may dictate to the jury what laws they are to enforce, it is no longer a " trial by the country," but a trial by the government; because the jury then try the accused, not by any standard of their own - not by their own judgments of their rightful liberties - but by a standard. dictated to them by the government. And the standard, thus dictated by the government, becomes the measure of the people's liberties. If the government dictate the standard of trial, it of course dictates the results of the trial. And such a trial is no trial by the country, but only a trial by the government; and in it the government determines what are its own powers over the people, instead of the people's determining what are their own liberties against the government. In short, if the jury have no right to judge of the justice of a law of the government, they plainly can do nothing to protect the people against the oppressions of the government; for there are no oppressions which the government may not authorize by law.

The jury are also to judge whether the laws are rightly expounded to them by the court. Unless they judge on this point, they do nothing to protect their liberties against the oppressions that are capable of being practiced under cover of a corrupt exposition of the laws. If the judiciary can authoritatively dictate to a jury any exposition of the law, they can dictate to them the law itself, and such laws as they please; because laws are, in practice, one thing or another, according as they are expounded.

The jury must also judge whether there really be any such law, (be it good or bad,) as the accused is charged with having transgressed. Unless they judge on this point, the people are liable to have their liberties taken from them by brute force, without any law at all.

The jury must also judge of the laws of evidence. If the government can dictate to a jury the laws of evidence, it can not only shut out any evidence it pleases, tending to vindicate the accused, but it can require that any evidence whatever, that it pleases to offer, be held as conclusive proof of any offence whatever which the government chooses to allege.

It is manifest, therefore, that the jury must judge of and try the whole case, and every part and parcel of the case, free of any dictation or authority on the part of the government. They must judge of the existence of the law; of the true exposition of the law; of the justice of the law; and of the admissibility and weight of all the evidence offered; otherwise the government will have everything its own way; the jury will be mere puppets in the hands of the government: and the trial will be, in reality, a trial by the government, and not a "trial by the country." By such trials the government will determine its own powers over the people, instead of the people's determining their own liberties against the government; and it will be an entire delusion to talk, as for centuries we have done, of the trial by jury, as a "palladium of liberty," or as any protection to the people against the oppression and tyranny of the government.

The question, then, between trial by jury, as thus described, and trial by the government, is simply a question between liberty and despotism. The authority to judge what are the powers of the government, and what the liberties of the people, must necessarily be vested in one or the other of the parties themselves - the government, or the people; because there is no third party to whom it can be entrusted. If the authority be vested in the government, the government is absolute, and the people have no liberties except such as the government sees fit to indulge them with. If, on the other hand, that authority be vested in the people, then the people have all liberties, (as against the government,) except such as substantially the whole people (through a jury) choose to disclaim; and the government can exercise no power except such as substantially the whole people (through a jury) consent that it may exercise.
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"There has, probably, never been a legal jury, nor a legal trial by jury, in a single court of the United States, since the adoption of the constitution.

"These facts show how much reliance can be placed in written constitutions, to control the action of the government, and preserve the liberties of the people.

"If the real trial by jury had been preserved in the courts of the United States - that is, if we had had legal juries, and the jurors had known their rights - it is hardly probable that one tenth of the past legislation of Congress would ever have been enacted, or, at least, that, if enacted, it could have been enforced."

http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/spooner-an-essay-on-the-trial-by-jury-1852

http://www.barefootsworld.net/trial06.html#p142

"Not only the opinion of the greatest men, and the experience of mankind, are against the idea of an extensive republic, but a variety of reasons may be drawn from the reason and nature of things, against it. In every government, the will of the sovereign is the law. In despotic governments, the supreme authority being lodged in one, his will is law, and can be as easily expressed to a large extensive territory as to a small one. In a pure democracy the people are the sovereign, and their will is declared by themselves; for this purpose they must all come together to deliberate, and decide. This kind of government cannot be exercised, therefore, over a country of any considerable extent; it must be confined to a single city, or at least limited to such bounds as that the people can conveniently assemble, be able to debate, understand the subject submitted to them, and declare their opinion concerning it." Brutus, 18 October, 1787,
To the Citizens of the State of New-York.




"Who can deny but the president general will be a king to all intents and purposes, and one of the most dangerous kind too; a king elected to command a standing army? Thus our laws are to be administered by this tyrant; for the whole, or at least the most important part of the executive department is put in his hands."

Philadelphiensis IX
February 06, 1788

http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/philadelphiensis-ix/


"The question, then, between trial by jury, as thus described, and trial by the government, is simply a question between liberty and despotism. The authority to judge what are the powers of the government, and what the liberties of the people, must necessarily be vested in one or the other of the parties themselves - the government, or the people; because there is no third party to whom it can be entrusted. If the authority be vested in the government, the government is absolute, and the people have no liberties except such as the government sees fit to indulge them with. If, on the other hand, that authority be vested in the people, then the people have all liberties, (as against the government,) except such as substantially the whole people (through a jury) choose to disclaim; and the government can exercise no power except such as substantially the whole people (through a jury) consent that it may exercise."

That is from an Essay on The Trial by Jury.


Here too:

"Congress have as much constitutional right to give over all the functions of the United States government into the hands of the state legislatures, to be exercised within each state in such manner as the legislature of such state shall please to exercise them, as they have to thus give up to these legislatures the selection of juries for the courts of the United States.
There has, probably, never been a legal jury, nor a legal trial by jury, in a single court of the United States, since the adoption of the constitution.

"These facts show how much reliance can be placed in written constitutions, to control the action of the government, and preserve the liberties of the people.

"If the real trial by jury had been preserved in the courts of the United States—that is, if we had had legal juries, and the jurors had known their rights—it is hardly probable that one tenth of the past legislation of Congress would ever have been enacted, or, at least, that, if enacted, it could have been enforced."


Abigail Adams to John Adams Braintree, Mass., March 31, 1776
"I have sometimes been ready to think that the passion for liberty cannot be equally strong in the breasts of those who have been accustomed to deprive their fellow creatures of theirs. Of this I am certain that it is not founded upon that generous and Christian principle of doing to others as we would that others should do unto us. . . . "


John Adams to James Sullivan Philadelphia, May 26, 1776
"Depend upon it, sir, it is dangerous to open so fruitful a source of controversy and altercation, as would be opened by attempting to alter the qualifications of voters. There will be no end of it. New claims will arise. Women will demand a vote. Lads from 12 to 21 will think their rights not enough attended to, and every man, who has not a farthing, will demand an equal voice with any other in all acts of state. It tends to confound and destroy all distinctions, and prostrate all ranks, to one common level."


Class warfare includes the employment of deception by individuals in the criminally aggressive class, targeting individuals in the targeted class. The targeted class are those who labor? Note the complete ignorance concerning the vote that matters out of the three boxes: Jury, ballot, cartridge.


Notes of Major William Pierce (Georgia) in the Federal Convention of 1787

"As the word perpetual in the Articles of confederation gave occasion for several Members to insist upon the main principles of the confederacy, i e that the several States should meet in the general Council on a footing of compleat equality each claiming the right of sovereignty, Mr. Butler observed that the word perpetual in the confederation meant only the constant existence of our Union, and not the particular words which compose the Articles of the union."

"Mr. Yates is said to be an able Judge. He is a Man of great legal abilities, but not distinguished as an Orator. Some of his Enemies say he is an anti- federal Man, but I discovered no such disposition in him. He is about 45 years old, and enjoys a great share of health."
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pierce.asp


Federal Farmer XV
January 18, 1788

"It is an observation of an approved writer, that judicial power is of such a nature, that when we have ascertained and fixed its limits, with all the caution and precision we can, it will yet be formidable, somewhat arbitrary and despotic — that is, after all our cares, we must leave a vast deal to the discretion and interpretation — to the wisdom, integrity, and politics of the judges — These men, such is the state even of the best laws, may do wrong, perhaps, in a thousand cases, sometimes with, and sometimes without design, yet it may be impracticable to convict them of misconduct."

"Add to these considerations, that particular circumstances exist at this time to increase our inattention to limiting properly the judicial powers, we may fairly conclude, we are more in danger of sowing the seeds of arbitrary government in this department than in any other."

"By art. 3. sect. 1. the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts, as congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish — the judges of them to hold their offices during good behaviour, and to receive, at stated times, a compensation for their services, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office; but which, I conceive, may be increased."

"These clauses present to view the constitutional features of the federal judiciary: this has been called a monster by some of the opponents, and some, even of the able advocates, have confessed they do not comprehend it. "

"The inferior federal courts are left by the constitution to be instituted and regulated altogether as the legislature shall judge best; and it is well provided, that the judges shall hold their offices during good behaviour."


"This organization, so far as it would respect questions of law, inferior, superior, and a special supreme court, would resemble that of New-York in a considerable degree, and those of several other states. This, I imagine, we must adopt, or else the Massachusetts plan; that is, a number of inferior courts, and one superior or supreme court, consisting of three, or five, or seven judges, in which one supreme court all the business shall be immediately collected from the inferior ones. The decision of the inferior courts, on either plan, probably will not much be relied on; and on the latter plan, there must be a prodigious accumulation of powers and business in all cases touching law, equity and facts, and all kinds of causes in a few hands, for whose errors of ignorance or design, there will be no possible remedy. As the legislature may adopt either of these, or any other plan, I shall not dwell longer on this subject."

Note in Federal Farmer 15 the lack of power (knowledge) of just how bad behavior (the opposite of good behavior) is remedied when summary justice judges are guilty in fact. Note also the feature of a federal system whereby systems of justice in each Nation State works as experiments in democracy. Note 2 the continued obfuscation of the meanings of words such as republic, democracy, federation, nation, justice, etc.


And here is what I was looking for:


"As the trial by jury is provided for in criminal causes, I shall confine my observations to civil causes — and in these, I hold it is the established right of the jury by the common law, and the fundamental laws of this country, to give a general verdict in all cases when they chuse to do it, to decide both as to law and fact, whenever blended together in the issue put to them. Their right to determine as to facts will not be disputed, and their right to give a general verdict has never been disputed, except by a few judges and lawyers, governed by despotic principles. Coke, Hale, Holt, Blackstone, De Lo[l]me, and almost every other legal or political writer, who has written on the subject, has uniformly asserted this essential and important right of the jury. Juries in Great-Britain and America have universally practised accordingly. Even Mansfield, with all his wishes about him, dare not directly avow the contrary. What fully confirms this point is, that there is no instance to be found, where a jury was ever punished for finding a general verdict, when a special one might, with propriety, have been found. The jury trial, especially politically considered, is by far the most important feature in the judicial department in a free country, and the right in question is far the most valuable part, and the last that ought to be yielded, of this trial. Juries are constantly and frequently drawn from the body of the people, and freemen of the country; and by holding the jury’s right to return a general verdict in all cases sacred, we secure to the people at large, their just and rightful controul in the judicial department. If the conduct of judges shall be severe and arbitrary, and tend to subvert the laws, and change the forms of government, the jury may check them, by deciding against their opinions and determinations, in similar cases. It is true, the freemen of a country are not always minutely skilled in the laws, but they have common sense in its purity, which seldom or never errs in making and applying laws to the condition of the people, or in determining judicial causes, when stated to them by the parties. The body of the people, principally, bear the burdens of the community; they of right ought to have a controul in its important concerns, both in making and executing the laws, otherwise they may, in a short time, be ruined. Nor is it merely this controul alone we are to attend to; the jury trial brings with it an open and public discussion of all causes, and excludes secret and arbitrary proceedings. This, and the democratic branch in the legislature, as was formerly observed, are the means by which the people are let into the knowledge of public affairs — are enabled to stand as the guardians of each others rights, and to restrain, by regular and legal measures, those who otherwise might infringe upon them. I am not unsupported in my opinion of the value of the trial by jury; not only British and American writers, but De Lo[l]me, and the most approved foreign writers, hold it to be the most valuable part of the British constitution, and indisputably the best mode of trial ever invented."


"It was merely by the intrigues of the popish clergy, and of the Norman lawyers, that this mode of trial was not used in maritime, ecclesiastical, and military courts, and the civil law proceedings were introduced; and, I believe, it is more from custom and prejudice, than for any substantial reasons, that we do not in all the states establish the jury in our maritime as well as other courts.

"In the civil law process the trial by jury is unknown; the consequence is, that a few judges and dependant officers, possess all the power in the judicial department. Instead of the open fair proceedings of the common law, where witnesses are examined in open court, and may be cross examined by the parties concerned — where council is allowed, &c. we see in the civil law process judges alone, who always, long previous to the trial, are known and often corrupted by ministerial influence, or by parties. Judges once influenced, soon become inclined to yield to temptations, and to decree for him who will pay the most for their partiality. It is, therefore, we find in the Roman, and almost all governments, where judges alone possess the judicial powers and try all cases, that bribery has prevailed. This, as well as the forms of the courts, naturally lead to secret and arbitrary proceedings — to taking evidence secretly– exparte, &c. to perplexing the cause — and to hasty decisions: — but, as to jurors, it is quite impracticable to bribe or influence them by any corrupt means; not only because they are untaught in such affairs, and possess the honest characters of the common freemen of a country; but because it is not, generally, known till the hour the cause comes on for trial, what persons are to form the jury."

"But it is said, that no words could be found by which the states could agree to establish the jury-trial in civil causes. I can hardly believe men to be serious, who make observations to this effect. The states have all derived judicial proceedings principally from one source, the British system; from the same common source the American lawyers have almost universally drawn their legal information. All the states have agreed to establish the trial by jury, in civil as well as in criminal causes. The several states, in congress, found no difficulty in establishing it in the Western Territory, in the ordinance passed in July 1787. We find, that the several states in congress, in establishing government in that territory, agreed, that the inhabitants of it, should always be entitled to the benefit of the trial by jury. Thus, in a few words, the jury trial is established in its full extent; and the convention with as much ease, have established the jury trial in criminal cases. In making a constitution, we are substantially to fix principles. — If in one state, damages on default are assessed by a jury, and in another by the judges — if in one state jurors are drawn out of a box, and in another not — if there be other trifling variations, they can be of no importance in the great question. Further, when we examine the particular practices of the states, in little matters in judicial proceedings, I believe we shall find they differ near as much in criminal processes as in civil ones. Another thing worthy of notice in this place — the convention have used the word equity, and agreed to establish a chancery jurisdiction; about the meaning and extent of which, we all know, the several states disagree much more than about jury trials — in adopting the latter, they have very generally pursued the British plan; but as to the former, we see the states have varied, as their fears and opinions dictated."

"By the common law, in Great Britain and America, there is no appeal from the verdict of the jury, as to facts, to any judges whatever — the jurisdiction of the jury is complete and final in this; and only errors in law are carried up to the house of lords, the special supreme court in Great Britain; or to the special supreme courts in Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, &c. Thus the juries are left masters as to facts: but, by the proposed constitution, directly the opposite principles is established. An appeal will lay in all appellate causes from the verdict of the jury, even as to mere facts, to the judges of the supreme court. Thus, in effect, we establish the civil law in this point; for if the jurisdiction of the jury be not final, as to facts, it is of little or no importance."


Federal Farmer 15 (Richard Henry Lee)
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/federal-farmer-xv/


Next is a description of the routine diversion of creating a Man of Straw, so as to then attack that fictional character, which is easy to accomplish since the fictional character created is weak, and this battle serves to distract from the facts that matter.

Federal Farmer LETTER VI.
DECEMBER 25, 1787.

"Had the advocates left the constitution, as they ought to have done, to be adopted or rejected on account of its own merits or imperfections, I do not believe the gentlemen who framed it would ever have been even alluded to in the contest by the opposers. Instead of this, the ardent advocates begun by quoting names as incontestible authorities for the implicit adoption of the system, without any examination—treated all who opposed it as friends of anarchy; and with an indecent virulence addressed M—n G—y, L—e, and almost every man of weight they could find in the opposition by name. If they had been candid men they would have applauded the moderation of the opposers for not retaliating in this pointed manner, when so fair an opportunity was given them; but the opposers generally saw that it was no time to heat the passions; but, at the same time, they saw there was something more than mere zeal in many of their adversaries; they saw them attempting to mislead the people, and to precipitate their divisions, by the sound of names, and forced to do it, the opposers, in general terms, alledged those names were not of sufficient authority to justify the hasty adoption of the system contended for. The convention, as a body, was undoubtedly respectable; it was, generally, composed of members of the then and preceding Congresses: as a body of respectable men we ought to view it. To select individual names, is an invitation to personal attacks, and the advocates, for their own sake, ought to have known the abilities, politics, and situation of some of their favourite characters better, before they held them up to view in the manner they did, as men entitled to our implicit political belief: they ought to have known, whether all the men they so held up to view could, for their past conduct in public offices, be approved or not by the public records, and the honest part of the community. These ardent advocates seem now to be peevish and angry, because, by their own folly, they have led to an investigation of facts and of political characters, unfavourable to them, which they had not the discernment to foresee. They may well apprehend they have opened a door to some Junius, or to some man, after his manner, with his polite addresses to men by name, to state serious facts, and unfold the truth; but these advocates may rest assured, that cool men in the opposition, best acquainted with the affairs of the country, will not, in the critical passage of a people from one constitution to another, pursue inquiries, which, in other circumstances, will be deserving of the highest praise. I will say nothing further about political characters, but examine the constitution; and as a necessary and previous measure to a particular examination, I shall state a few general positions and principles, which receive a general assent, and briefly notice the leading features of the confederation, and several state conventions [i.e., constitutions], to which, through the whole investigation, we must frequently have recourse, to aid the mind in its determinations."

Now another confusion concerning the meaning of the term national, as if the word was a synonym for federal, yet distinctions were elucidated in other works by this author, and others. National is explained as a connection to individuals, as exemplified by some form of tax upon individuals, while a federal tax is a demand for what amounts to an insurance policy premium, a payment to cover the costs of maintaining a voluntary mutual defense association.

"Our territories are far too extensive for a limited monarchy, in which the representatives must frequently assemble, and the laws operate mildly and systematically. The most elligible system is a federal republic, that is, a system in which national concerns may be transacted in the centre, and local affairs in state or district governments."


What exactly is meant in the following:

"The people by Magna Charta, &c. did not acquire powers, or receive privileges from the king, they only ascertained and fixed those they were entitled to as Englishmen; the title used by the king “we grant,” was mere form. Representation, and the jury trial, are the best features of a free government ever as yet discovered, and the only means by which the body of the people can have their proper influence in the affairs of government."

A confirmation of "equal protection," in other words:

"Individual security consists in having free recourse to the laws—"

Next are words describing the process often called "Mob Rule" or "democracy," and again this is a confounding of words, which causes confusion. Also on the following are words that describe the process known as "experiments in democracy," which can be described also as free market government services. "Popular instability" could mean an abuse of power accountable to any number of people having the power to abuse, but how can that happen more than once if those who are abusing power are held to account for that abuse of power? Only in despotic organizations, also known a involuntary associations, can any number of people gain enough power to abuse more than a few times. The check on abuse of power is supposed to be rule of law, or the capacity of any number of people to process anyone accused of wrongdoing (abuse of power), so that brings back the earlier quote concerning equal protection, or free access to rule of law.

"Pennsylvania has lodged all her legislative powers in a single branch, and Georgia has done the same; the other eleven states have each in their legislatures a second or senatorial branch. In forming this they have combined various principles, and aimed at several checks and balances. It is amazing to see how ingenuity has worked in the several states to fix a barrier against popular instability."

Next are references to something called "freehold," which could possibly mean allodial title. The following also lends more information to the concept of free market government (in a voluntary mutual defense association or federation), also known as "experiments in democracy."

"In New-York the electors must each have a freehold worth 250 dollars, in North-Carolina a freehold of fifty acres of land; in the other states the electors of senators are qualified as electors of representatives are. In Massachusetts a senator must have a freehold in his own right worth 1000 dollars, or any estate worth 2000, in New Jersey any estate worth 2666, in South-Carolina worth 1300 dollars, in North-Carolina 300 acres of land in fee, &c. The numbers of senators in each state are from ten to thirty-one, about 160 in the eleven states, about one to 14000 inhabitants."

Ending letter VI with another mention of trial by jury and the common law:

"Each state has a judicial branch; each common law courts, superior and inferior; some chancery and admiralty courts: The courts in general sit in different places, in order to accommodate the citizens. The trial by jury is had in all the common law courts, and in some of the admiralty courts. The democratic freemen principally form the juries; men destitute of property, of character, or under age, are excluded as in elections. Some of the judges are during good behaviour, and some appointed for a year, and some for years; and all are dependant on the legislatures for their salaries-Particulars respecting this department are too many to be noticed here."


LETTER VII.
DECEMBER 31, 1787

In the words below there is missing the force of deception, which is odd because among the works of this Farmer are words eluding to the deceptions employed by the Nationalists to mislabel themselves as Federalists, and mislabel their opposition as Anti-Federalists. The power of deception includes the power to ignore that power.

"Perhaps it is not possible for a government to be so despotic, as not to operate persuasively on some of its subjects; nor is it, in the nature of things, I conceive, for a government to be so free, or so supported by voluntary consent, as never to want force to compel obedience to the laws. In despotic governments one man, or a few men, independant of the people, generally make the laws, command obedience, and inforce it by the sword: one-fourth part of the people are armed, and obliged to endure the fatigues of soldiers, to oppress the others and keep them subject to the laws. In free governments the people, or their representatives, make the laws; their execution is principally the effect of voluntary consent and aid; the people respect the magistrate, follow their private pursuits, and enjoy the fruits of their labour with very small deductions for the public use."

Next is a reference to confidence, and if deception is the rule, not the exception, then it is a confidence scheme: con job.

"It being impracticable for the people to assemble to make laws, they must elect legislators, and assign men to the different departments of the government. In the representative branch we must expect chiefly to collect the confidence of the people, and in it to find almost entirely the force of persuasion. In forming this branch, therefore, several important considerations must be attended to. It must possess abilities to discern the situation of the people and of public affairs, a disposition to sympathize with the people, and a capacity and inclination to make laws congenial to their circumstances and condition: it must afford security against interested combinations, corruption and influence; it must possess the confidence, and have the voluntary support of the people."

Next are words eluding to the Mob Rule (false democracy) scheme, having to do with the same process noted by the work on the Athenian Constitution, whereby electoral politics tends toward oligarchy. When, as stated earlier by Federal Farmer, the trial by jury (consent of the governed) process is in force, there is both determination to find the truth (a jury that is not criminally stacked toward falsehood), and there is a true representation of the country (nation?), as jurors are randomly selected as is done in science known as a "representative sample." So here, in fact (if facts matter), the proposed Mob Rule (so -called democracy) aspect of the Con Con Con Job is a representation of the oligarchy, not the "nation" (country: people as one), thereby a false "check" on the oligarchic Senate, and oligarchic King.

"Where the people, or their representatives, make the laws, it is probable they will generally be fitted to the national character and circumstances, unless the representation be partial, and the imperfect substitute of the people."

Further words on a the same Mob Rule (the people govern themselves) are again stated by Federal Farmer. Why is it assumed that a government will be corrupt, or involuntary? If trial by jury works, then there is no Mob Rule, no corruption (none that is out of the reach of the grand jurors, and trial jurors), and therefore whoever rules, no matter which portion of the whole people, a king, a senate, a mob, whatever, it is rule by voluntary association: consent. If it is assumed that it will be unconsentual rule, also known as crime, then why is it assumed, especially when it is at the same time assumed that trial by jury (common law) will be in force? The answer is obvious: trial by jury is thrown out, and replaced with summary justice.

"However, the people may be electors, if the representation be so formed as to give one or more of the natural classes of men in the society an undue ascendency over the others, it is imperfect; the former will gradually become masters, and the latter slaves. It is the first of all among the political balances, to preserve in its proper station each of these classes."

Naming "classes" rather than names, Federal Farmer explains who (which groups) are behind the corrupting of government, this is the same message offered in the Athenian Constitution work. If government is consensual (not corrupt), not slavery under the color of law (corrupt), it is maintained that way through trial by the country (nation? or the whole people as one: republic), as representation of the people is actual, not chimerical.

"We talk of balances in the legislature, and among the departments of government; we ought to carry them to the body of the people. Since I advanced the idea of balancing the several orders of men in a community, in forming a genuine representation,s and seen that idea considered as chemerical, I have been sensibly struck with a sentence in the marquis Beccaria’,s treatise: this sentence was quoted by congress in 1774, and is as follows:—”In every society there is an effort continually tending to confer on one part the height of power and happiness, and to reduce the others to the extreme of weakness and misery; the intent of good laws is to oppose this effort, and to diffuse their influence universally and equally.” Add to this Montesquieu’s opinion, that “in a free state every man, who is supposed to be a free agent, ought to be concerned in his own government: therefore, the legislative should reside in the whole body of the people, or their representatives.” It is extremely clear that these writers had in view the several orders of men in society, which we call aristocratical, democratical, merchantile, mechanic, &c. and perceived the efforts they are constantly, from interested and ambitious views, disposed to make to elevate themselves and oppress others. Each order must have a share in the business of legislation actually and efficiently. It is deceiving a people to tell them they are electors, and can chuse their legislators, if they cannot, in the nature of things, chuse men from among themselves, and genuinely like themselves. "

Next is a greater elaboration on the divisions between classes (in a voluntary association there is no corruption), with notations on who, and why, there are abuses, but if the government is voluntary (trial by jury), then abuses are not legal, and therefore abuses are a problem that can be solved by due process, which is the actual law, not statutes, whereby statutes are suggestions.

"I wish you to take another idea along with you; we are not only to balance these natural efforts, but we are also to guard against accidental combinations; combinations founded in the connections of offices and private interests, both evils which are increased in proportion as the number of men, among which the elected must be, are decreased. To set this matter in a proper point of view, we must form some general ideas and descriptions of the different classes of men, as they may be divided by occupations and politically: the first class is the aristocratical. There are three kinds of aristocracy spoken of in this country—the first is a constitutional one, which does not exist in the United States in our common acceptation of the word. Montesquieu, it is true, observes, that where a part of the persons in a society, for want of property, age, or moral character, are excluded any share in the government, the others, who alone are the constitutional electors and elected, form this aristocracy; this according to him, exists in each of the United States, where a considerable number of persons, as all convicted of crimes, under age, or not possessed of certain property, are excluded any share in the government; the second is an aristocratic faction, a junto of unprincipled men, often distinguished for their wealth or abilities, who combine together and make their object their private interests and aggrandizement; the existence of this description is merely accidental, but particularly to be guarded against. The third is the natural aristocracy; this term we use to designate a respectable order of men, the line between whom and the natural democracy is in some degree arbitrary; we may place men on one side of this line, which others may place on the other, and in all disputes between the few and the many, a considerable number are wavering and uncertain themselves on which side they are, or ought to be. In my idea of our natural aristocracy in the United States, I include about four or five thousand men; and among these I reckon those who have been placed in the offices of governors, of members of Congress, and state senators generally, in the principal officers of Congress, of the army and militia, the superior judges, the most eminent professional men, &c. and men of large property—the other persons and orders in the community form the natural democracy; this includes in general the yeomanry, the subordinate officers, civil and military, the fishermen, mechanics and traders, many of the merchants and professional men. It is easy to perceive that men of these two classes, the aristocratical, and democratical, with views equally honest, have sentiments widely different, especially respecting public and private expences, salaries, taxes, &c. Men of the first class associate more extensively, have a high sense of honor, possess abilities, ambition, and general knowledge: men of the second class are not so much used to combining great objects; they possess less ambition, and a larger share of honesty: their dependence is principally on middling and small estates, industrious pursuits, and hard labour, while that of the former is principally on the emoluments of large estates, and of the chief offices of government. Not only the efforts of these two great parties are to be balanced, but other interests and parties also, which do not always oppress each other merely for want of power, and for fear of the consequences; though they, in fact, mutually depend on each other; yet such are their general views, that the merchants alone would never fail to make laws favourable to themselves and oppressive to the farmers, &c. the farmers alone would act on like principles; the former would tax the land, the latter the trade. The manufacturers are often disposed to contend for monopolies, buyers make every exertion to lower prices, and sellers to raise them; men who live by fees and salaries endeavour to raise them, and the part of the people who pay them, endeavour to lower them; the public creditors to augment the taxes, and the people at large to lessen them. Thus, in every period of society, and in all the transactions of men, we see parties verifying the observation made by the Marquis; and those classes which have not their centinels in the government, in proportion to what they have to gain or lose, must infallibly be ruined."

Next is elaboration on the concept of "Mob Rule" as a creation of the enfranchised oligarchy (corrupt rulers) upon the disenfranchised slaves.

"Efforts among parties are not merely confined to property; they contend for rank and distinctions; all their passions in turn are enlisted in political controversies—Men, elevated in society, are often disgusted with the changeableness of the democracy, and the latter are often agitated with the passions of jealousy and envy: the yeomanry possess a large share of property and strength, are nervous and firm in their opinions and habits—the mechanics of towns are ardent and changeable, honest and credulous, they are inconsiderable for numbers, weight and strength, not always sufficiently stable for the supporting free governments; the fishing interest partakes partly of the strength and stability of the landed, and partly of the changeableness of the mechanic interest. As to merchants and traders, they are our agents in almost all money transactions; give activity to government, and possess a considerable share of influence in it. It has been observed by an able writer, that frugal industrious merchants are generally advocates for liberty. It is an observation, I believe, well founded, that the schools produce but few advocates for republican forms of government; gentlemen of the law, divinity, physic, &c. probably form about a fourth part of the people; yet their political influence, perhaps, is equal to that of all the other descriptions of men; if we may judge from the appointments to Congress, the legal characters will often, in a small representation, be the majority; but the more the representatives are encreased, the more of the farmers, merchants, &c. will be found to be brought into the government."

Again Federal Farmer elaborates on the scheme by which the angry mob is created by those against so-called democracy.

"Could we get over all our difficulties respecting a balance of interests and party efforts, to raise some and oppress others, the want of sympathy, information and intercourse between the representatives and the people, an insuperable difficulty will still remain, I mean the constant liability of a small number of representatives to private combinations; the tyranny of the one, or the licentiousness of the multitude, are, in my mind, but small evils, compared with the factions of the few. It is a consideration well worth pursuing, how far this house of representatives will be liable to be formed into private juntos, how far influenced by expectations of appointments and offices, how far liable to be managed by the president and senate, and how far the people will have confidence in them. To obviate difficulties on this head, as well as objections to the representative branch, generally, several observations have been made—these I will now examine, and if they shall appear to be unfounded, the objections must stand unanswered."

Next the Federal Farmer appears to have given license to the replacement of a Federal System of Independent Nations (states) joined voluntarily for mutual defense (which is in itself a benefit) - preplacing voluntary association - with involuntary association, or a Nation State (consolidating the states, which are then no longer experiments in democracy) with absolute power, since trial by jury is placed under the summary justice "Supreme" courts system of exortion. Note in the words following that had he been speaking about one Nation State (one of the states that constitute the federation), then any imperfections in that individual Nation State could be compared to imperfections in the other Nation States, as well as any perfections compared in those experiments in democracy. If one Nation State becomes mobbish, and another Nation State becomes tyrannical, which appears to be the opposite directions that Nation States may go when they become tyrannical, or involuntary, or criminal, and while seeing this in this light, would it also be noted that those states, having become tyrannical in either of those directions, would have had to usurp trial by jury?
Note also the use of the "That..." beginning to each message.

"That the state governments will form a part of, and a balance in the system.

"That Congress will have only a few national objects to attend to, and the state governments many and local ones.
That the new Congress will be more numerous than the present, and that any numerous body is unwieldy and mobbish.

"That the states only are represented in the present Congress, and that the people will require a representation in the new one; that in fifty or an hundred years the representation will be numerous.

"That congress will have no temptation to do wrong; and that no system to enslave the people is practicable.
That as long as the people are free they will preserve free governments; and that when they shall become tired of freedom, arbitrary government must take place."


LETTER VIII.
JANUARY 3, 1788

"Before the Norman conquest the people of England enjoyed much of this liberty. The first of the Norman kings, aided by foreign mercenaries and foreign attendants, obnoxious to the English, immediately laid arbitrary taxes, and established arbitrary courts, and severely oppress[ed] all orders of people: The barons and people, who recollected their former liberties, were induced, by those oppressions, to unite their efforts in their common defence:"

Note the routine of criminal gangs counterfeiting government by counterfeiting tax (real tax is voluntary: consented to by the taxed), counterfeiting courts, whereby the criminal gangs exist only so long as their slaves continue to fund the actions perpetrated by the criminal gangs.

"It was in this united situation the people of England were for several centuries, enabled to combine their exertions, and by compacts, as Magna Charta, a bill of rights, &c. were able to limit, by degrees, the royal prerogatives, and establish their own liberties."

A failure there is exposed in the contradiction of people having to "establish" something that already exists, something that existed before, and after, that something was established. I could be less contradictory, and less of a failure to explain that it was reestablished as a duty required of free people: to hold everyone, inlcuding governments, to account for their crimes: a deterent. That process of holding everyone, even government agents, to account is the work required by people to maintain liberty: due process of law, equal protection under the law, rule of law, trial by the country according to the common law, etc.

In the work of Lysander Spooner, for example, the Saxons brought to England the concept of the people being the government with their trial by the country, that was done after the Roman Empire collapsed (all criminal organizations feed upon itself: consume itself) and could no longer afford to subject English people to Roman Extortion under the color of law. The English were thereby governing themselves as Anglo-Saxons, that was before the Norman Conquest.

"In England, the people have been led uniformly, and systematically by their representatives to secure their rights by compact, and to abolish innovations upon the government: they successively obtained Magna Charta, the powers of taxation, the power to propose laws, the habeas corpus act, bill of rights, &c. they, in short, secured general and equal liberty, security to their persons and property; and, as an everlasting security and bulwark of their liberties, they fixed the democratic branch in the legislature, and jury trial in the execution of the laws, the freedom of the press, &c."

There in those words are falsehoods, or half truths, as the English were, and still are, criminals who fund aggressive wars for profit, as exemplified in the aggressive attack upon America, so as to subsidize the enslavement of Americans, and any other slaves, such as the Irish, and Africans. And as to the English Magna Carta, that was a document that did not establish what already existed, which was trial by the country, or government by the people themselves, the document merely recorded a King's acknowlegment of that fact, and furthermore the same King rejected the document when he sold the English (and Americans) out to the Roman Pope. Look up The papal bull annulling Magna Carta, and the criminal in the case is ironically named Pope Innocent III.

Next are words from Federal Farmer explaining more of the same half truth concerning how the people represent the government. In the following words he explains that the Con of 1789 will under-represent the people, and over-represent the aristocracy. Why is it that the aristocracy has any more say than the laborers, or the Indians, or the African slaves, or the Irish indentured servants? Why isn't Congress divided into all those parts, why is it that the aristocracy are somehow given (actually they take, by criminal means) special priviledges in government? The answer is clearly such that they buy (bribe) their way into power, after they steal their way into power, by fraud, threat of aggressive violence, and aggressive violence.


" The whole community, probably, not more than two-fifths more numerous than we now are, were represented by seven or eight hundred men; the barons stipulated with the common people, and the king with the whole. Had the legal distinction between lords and commons been broken down, and the people of that island been called upon to elect forty-five senators, and one hundred and twenty representatives, about the proportion we propose to establish, their whole legislature evidently would have been of the natural aristocracy, and the body of the people would not have had scarcely a single sincere advocate; their interests would have been neglected, general and equal liberty forgot, and the balance lost; contests and conciliations, as in most other countries, would have been merely among the few, and as it might have been necessary to serve their purposes, the people at large would have been flattered or threatened, and probably not a single stipulation made in their favour."

Next is a general contradiction that confesses something worth known: many seeking power during the power grab (filling a vacuum) after the Revolutionary War claimed that governments ought to be resisted from time to time (having just resisted the British Empire, to say otherwise would be contradictory), and yet the resistance in Massachusetts (so-called Shays's Rebellion) was claimed as the reason to get rid of the Federation, and turn the Federation (where resistance is legal) into a Nation State (where crushing resistance, and making the resistors pay for crushing the resistance, is "legal"). So there is the confession, those who may claim that resistance is necessary (when they do it, see Generalissimo Washington), are those who crush resistance when resistors refuse to pay for their own demise.

"We are not like the people of England, one people compactly settled on a small island, with a great city filled with frugal merchants, serving as a common centre of liberty and union: we are dispersed, and it is impracticable for any but the few to assemble in one place: the few must be watched, checked, and often resisted—tyranny has ever shewn a prediliction to be in close amity with them, or the one man. Drive it from kings and it flies to senators, to dicemvirs, to dictators, to tribunes, to popular leaders, to military chiefs, &c."

And finally in Letter 8:

"De Lome well observes, that in societies, laws which were to be equal to all are soon warped to the private interests of the administrators, and made to defend the usurpations of a few. The English, who had tasted the sweets of equal laws, were aware of this, and though they restored their king, they carefully delegated to parliament the advocates of freedom.

"I have often lately heard it observed, that it will do very well for a people to make a constitution, and ordain, that at stated periods they will chuse, in a certain manner, a first magistrate, a given number of senators and representatives, and let them have all power to do as they please. This doctrine, however it may do for a small republic, as Connecticut, for instance, where the people may chuse so many senators and representatives to assemble in the legislature, in an eminent degree, the interests, the views, feelings, and genuine sentiments of the people themselves, can never be admitted in an extensive country; and when this power is lodged in the hands of a few, not to limit the few, is but one step short of giving absolute power to one man—in a numerous representation the abuse of power is a common injury, and has no temptation—among the few, the abuse of power may often operate to the private emolument of those who abuse it."

LETTER VIII.
JANUARY 4, 1788
Continued:
http://www.power-independence.com/forum/view_topic.php?id=1360&forum_id=2&jump_to=7864#p7864

"The true idea is, so to open and enlarge the representation as to let in a due proportion of the third class with those of the first."

Above is a small portion of the effort to expose the anti-democratic (not Mob Rule democracy, but rule by the whole people, so anti-demoratic means rule by the few, which is absolute rule, which corrupts everyone as a rule) nature of the proposed "Constitution" intended to replace the existing Constitution. Note the reference to more democratic military government compared to a less democratic "Constitution," which is counterfeit as explained with the reference to aristocracy ruling the lower classes: without consent. Consent is facilitated with trial by jury. See the Athenian example of democracy, and see the work by Rothbard titled Generalissimo Washington on the differences between bottom up, democracy, or rule by the peole themselves, versus rule by a so-called "elite."

Federal Farmer: An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/federal-farmer-an-additional-number-of-letters-to-the-republican/

The Conviction Factory, The Collapse of America's Criminal Courts, by Roger Roots
Page 40
Private Prosecutors
"For decades